By Mohamed Ali
Somalia is not stuck in transition. It is governed by it.
For more than two decades, Somali leaders and their international partners have described the country as “provisional”: a temporary constitution, interim political arrangements, evolving federal boundaries, indirect elections justified by exceptional circumstances. The assumption has always been that transition is a stage—unfortunate but necessary—on the way to a finished state.
But transition is no longer a phase. It is the system.
Somalia’s political order has hardened around incompleteness. What was once meant to stabilize a shattered country has become a self-perpetuating arrangement that rewards ambiguity, delays accountability and benefits those with the most to lose from closure.
The result is a state that functions just enough to survive, but never enough to settle.
When Temporary Rules Become Permanent Power
In the years following Somalia’s collapse in 1991, provisional arrangements were unavoidable. Rebuilding institutions after total state failure required flexibility. Power-sharing formulas reduced the risk of renewed civil war. External support filled gaps the state could not yet manage.
Over time, however, provisionalism stopped being a safeguard and became a strategy.
Unfinished rules allow leaders to govern without fully defined constraints. A provisional constitution can be interpreted selectively. Unresolved federal arrangements allow authority to expand or contract depending on political needs. Indirect elections limit public pressure while preserving the appearance of legitimacy.
In such a system, uncertainty is not a bug. It is the operating logic.
Final settlements—on constitutional authority, federal power-sharing or electoral rules—would impose limits. They would create clarity. And clarity would reduce leverage for elites accustomed to negotiating power rather than being bound by it.
Who Gains From an Unfinished State
Somalia’s political class is often portrayed as fragmented, chaotic or incapable of agreement. In reality, it has shown remarkable coherence in preserving a system that protects elite interests.
Federalism remains unresolved not because consensus is impossible, but because ambiguity is useful. Clear divisions of power between Mogadishu and federal member states would settle disputes over revenues, security forces and foreign engagement. As long as these questions remain open, bargaining continues—and bargaining is power.
Elections follow the same logic. Indirect, clan-mediated processes are defended as security necessities. But they also insulate decision-making from citizens and delay the emergence of mass-based politics that could disrupt elite accommodation.
International actors are not innocent bystanders. A permanent transition allows donors to remain engaged without demanding politically risky outcomes. Progress is measured in process—dialogues held, frameworks launched, units trained—rather than in final decisions that would inevitably produce winners and losers.
Motion substitutes for arrival.
Security as Excuse, Not Explanation
Al-Shabaab is frequently cited as the reason Somalia cannot complete its transition. The threat is real and deadly. But insecurity has also become a justification for deferral.
Constitutional review can wait until security improves. Electoral reform can wait. Federal disputes can wait.
Yet the paradox is stark: Somalia’s insecurity is reinforced by its unfinished political order. Fragmented authority undermines unified command. Ambiguous legitimacy weakens public trust. A state that cannot define itself cannot convincingly defeat an insurgency that offers certainty—however brutal—in place of ambiguity.
Permanent transition does not contain insecurity. It feeds it.
The Hidden Cost: A Generation That Has Stopped Waiting
The deepest damage of Somalia’s endless provisionality is not institutional. It is societal.
Young Somalis have grown up under successive “turning points” that never quite turn. Each political cycle is framed as decisive; each outcome postpones resolution. Participation becomes performative. Cynicism replaces expectation. For many, disengagement or migration feels more rational than reform.
Meanwhile, governance remains transactional. Authority flows through personal networks rather than institutions. Loyalty is negotiated, not embedded. The state is visible when compliance is required and absent when services are needed.
This is not state failure. It is state suspension.
Ending Transition Means Choosing Losers
What would it take for Somalia to complete its transition? Not perfection. Closure.
Closure on the constitution, even if flawed. Closure on federal arrangements, even if contested. Closure on electoral rules that privilege citizens over gatekeepers. These decisions would create losers—and that is precisely why they are avoided.
The real obstacle is not capacity or culture or insecurity. It is political will.
As long as Somalia’s leaders—and their international partners—treat incompleteness as safer than settlement, the country will continue to orbit statehood without entering it. Governments will change. Roadmaps will be rewritten. Transitions will be extended.
Somalia will keep moving.
It just won’t arrive.
The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any organization or institution.
